Ahmed Riza, a Young Turk Senator, Advocates for Armenians

Ahmed Riza, an early leader of the Young Turks and a senator in the Ottoman parliament during and after the genocide, found himself, as a Turkish politician, a witness to the unfolding genocide as well as being part of a government that was responsible. What could he do to stop the atrocities? What were the risks of taking a stand?

The deportations of Armenians began in early 1915 without a debate in Parliament. But debate was permitted over a later bill, The Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation, which allowed the government to confiscate Armenian cash and property and resell it for profit. This gave Senator Riza an opening. He argued that the proposed law violated basic constitutional protections and pleaded for the government to assume responsibility for the people who were being deported.

Senator Riza pleaded with his government to allow the deportees, "hundreds of thousands of whom, women, children and old people, are helplessly and miserably wandering around the streets and mountains of Anatolia, to return to their original places of residence or to settle wherever they wish before the onset of winter." He then submitted a draft bill that proposed to postpone the Temporary Laws application until after the end of the war, arguing that the Temporary Law was, "contrary to . . . the Ottoman Constitution. . . . [I]t is also inimical to the principles of law and justice." ¹ Riza’s actions provoked a strong backlash and ultimately no action was taken on Riza's proposal.

Despite the pressure he faced, Riza continued to speak out forcefully. In a later session of parliament, he once again took up the issue of confiscated Armenian property. He argued:

It is unlawful to designate the Armenian assets and properties as "abandoned goods" for the Armenians, the proprietors, did not abandon their properties voluntarily; they were forcibly . . . removed from their domiciles [homes] and exiled. Now the government through its officials is selling their goods. . . . Nobody can sell my property if I am unwilling to sell it. . . . If we are a constitutional regime functioning in accordance with constitutional law we can't do this. This is atrocious. Grab my arm, eject me from my village, then sell my goods and properties, such a thing can never be permissible. Neither the conscience of the Ottomans nor the law can allow it. ²

In December 1916, Riza continued his resistance when he took on the “Special Organization”: bands of militants, composed of Circassian and Kurdish tribesmen as well as criminals and prisoners, organized by CUP leaders to help carry out deportations and massacres of Armenians. Without raising questions about its actions directly, Riza argued that the law allowing convicts to enroll in the Special Organization degraded the military. He argued that:

Our nation's respect for the military, its esteem of and affection for the military corps, is great. Those who are enrolled in it are [expected to] not only protect its rights, but also its honor. . . . Parents, who learn of the presence in the army of murderers and criminals, do not want to send their offspring to it; even if they did, they would do it with feelings of loathing and disgust. . . . [The convicts'] immorality and wicked attitudes can, however, be contagious for their companions, and corrupt the sense of morality in the Army. ³

Discussion Questions

1. Who in this reading was in the position to act in response to the crimes being committed against Armenians?
2. What could this person or group have done in order to stop or prevent acts of violence against Armenians? What options for action might have been available to them?
3. Why might their decision about how to respond have been difficult to make? What dilemmas did they face?
4. What did the person or group ultimately do?
5. Why do you think they made this choice?

• 1Quoted in Vahakn N. Darian, “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,” Yale Journal of International Law 14 (1989), 268.
• 2Vahakn N. Darian, “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,” Yale Journal of International Law 14 (1989), 269.
• 3Vahakn N. Darian, “The Complicity of the Party, the Government, and the Military, Select Parliamentary and Judicial Documents,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 22 (Summer 1994), 54.